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Abstract 
 
Increasingly, state and local governments are promoting intergovernmental coordination, 
cooperation, and/or outright consolidation (3Cs) based on the perceived economies of scale 
advantages of such joint actions.  However, the growing public finance and political science 
literature on interregional cooperation highlights the fact that transactions or other cooperation 
costs may preclude the realization of economies of scale benefits.  Despite this evidence, some 
proponents go as far as to view such collaborative actions as effective policy tools for enhancing 
regional economic development and competitiveness.  The role of cooperation costs and their 
relationship to economies of scale are not well documented in the literature.   
This paper develops a framework for evaluating the implications of cooperation costs for 
the effectiveness of intergovernmental collaborations.  A simple cost function model is used to 
explain the costs and challenges associated with managing coordinated, cooperative, and 
consolidated relationships and the dynamic nature of such costs   The analysis highlights the 
importance of such things as degree of complexity, inter-party diversity, and the relative sizes of 
collaborating partners.   
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Cooperation Costs and the Economics of Intergovernmental Partnerships 
 
 
Introduction 
One of the most highly debated issues in the area of local government finance is the 
implication of intergovernmental coordination, cooperation, and consolidation (outright mergers) 
for the operating efficiency of cooperating units (Tiebout 1956, Lowery 2000, Downs 1994, 
Rusk 1993).1   Increasingly, communities are cooperating, and in some cases, consolidating their 
resources based on the perceived and expected short and long-term impacts on service delivery 
costs.  At the state level, the potential that cooperation could reduce the fixed and operating costs 
of communities and therefore lead to lower costs of doing business has led many states to 
explore how state policy could be tweaked to support local communities and encourage 
intergovernmental cooperation.  To the extent to which municipal service costs could be reduced 
or contained, the welfare of residents and businesses could be enhanced through cooperation.   
Governments are responsible for the finance, production and distribution of services to 
citizens.  To the extent to which there exist economies of scale in the production of these services 
through joint production between government entities, when barriers do not exist, one would 
expect government units to cooperate.  Municipal service activities are funded primarily through 
local property taxes.  Because lower municipal service costs would imply lower property taxes, 
reduced cost of living and, therefore, an enhanced quality of life, constituents can be expected to 
support cooperative efforts in the presence of economies of scale benefits.  Especially when 
budgets are tight due to a slowing economy, municipalities are encouraged to explore ways to 
                                                 
1 Coordination is defined simply as two communities exchanging information and keeping each other informed 
about activities of mutual interest. Cooperation is a higher level of interaction, and could involve the joint provision 
of services by two or more communities.  Cooperation could take the form of the less frequently observed, but more 
formal means of cooperation such as consolidation (outright merger).  Consolidation is considered to be special or 
extreme case of cooperation. 
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reduce their costs, due in part to pressures from constituents.  Cooperation appears on the surface 
to be a promising tool to achieve such welfare goals.   
On the business side, lower costs of providing services imply lower property taxes.  This 
could translate into a lower cost of doing business and, therefore, a more enabling business 
environment.  The growing desire by communities and regions to attract new businesses and new 
jobs has fueled interest in promoting cooperation as a strategy for attracting businesses by 
creating a more competitive business environment.  Moreover, many issues that are important to 
local communities transcend jurisdictional boundaries, and the action of one government unit 
impacts on the activities of others.  Therefore, intergovernmental cooperation is at least relevant 
to the concept of regional competitiveness and to the regional business climate.   
Direct evidence of the benefits of cooperation is, at best, spotty.  Such evidence could 
enhance the motivation for cooperation.  Despite the paucity of such evidence, many 
communities and policy makers view the economies of scale benefits of cooperation to be 
positive and therefore are seeking new ways to achieve joint action.  In the case of Michigan, the 
Michigan Land Use Leadership Council (MLULC) targeted municipal cooperation as a key 
strategy for moving the state forward.  The call for cooperation is growing as the Governor’s 
office has identified municipal cooperation as an area to be promoted in the near future.   
The ongoing debate across the United States about inter-local cooperation has been silent 
about transactions costs, despite significant treatment of these costs in economic and political 
literature (Coase 1960, Feiock 2004).  To mitigate effects of opportunism, reduce uncertainty and 
ensure compliance, organizations must implement pre- and post-contract oversight, which, in 
turn, generates transactions costs (Brown and Potoski 2003).  Transaction cost analysis has 
traditionally been applied to firms and markets, but is also applicable to the analysis of 
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contracting among governmental organizations (Brown and Potoski 2003).  The broader concept 
of cooperation costs has also been introduced, especially in the literature on business cooperation 
(White 2005, White and Lui 2005).   
Coase Theorem provides the basic framework for looking at the impact of transactions 
costs (Coase 1960).  When transaction costs do not exist or are low, agents will cooperate to 
correct misallocations of public goods, thereby correcting for externalities.  In reality, however, 
given the nature of cooperation and the structure of communities, it is postulated that 
transactions costs are not likely to be low due to problems of asset specificity, monitoring, risk, 
uncertainty, and imperfect information.  Therefore, barriers may exist that prevent communities 
from choosing to cooperate even if such cooperation is mutually beneficial in the long run.  The 
existence of excessive cooperation costs at the onset may provide a strong rationale for 
government intervention to help jurisdictions financially to overcome those costs if there is the 
potential to increase social welfare in the joint provision of services long term. 
It is important to understand the nature of transactions costs.  Because humans are subject 
to bounded rationality, full information will typically be elusive, and all forms of contracting will 
be necessarily incomplete, making contracting inevitably subject to non-completion due to 
opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1981).  This generates a pattern of transactions costs that are 
difficult to anticipate at the onset of pending cooperation.  Transactions costs therefore include 
costs associated with discovery, planning, adapting and monitoring the completion of tasks under 
alternative governance structures that are not always clear to the actors (see Williamson 1981).  
Bounded rationality and uncertainty prevent economic agents from being able to fully predict the 
outcomes of contractual arrangements.  Whether transactions costs are real or not, the perception 
of uncertainty about cooperation is a real barrier that must be overcome.  The relative 
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magnitudes of pre- and post-cooperation costs may also affect the potential for voluntary 
cooperation and determine the extent of incentives needed.    
An appropriate starting point for guidance on the importance of transactions costs is the 
emerging literature on cooperation, strategic alliances and mergers and acquisitions.  White 
(2005) and White et al. (2005) suggest that the transactions cost perspective has two limitations: 
(1) it does not recognize the benefits of alliances and (2) it expresses overly strong concern about 
issues of control and monitoring costs by focusing too much attention on opportunistic behavior.  
They argue that this approach does not allow adequate focus on the costs of cooperation, which 
are influenced by several relevant factors not addressed in transaction cost analysis.  White and 
partners therefore suggest a more comprehensive approach that allows examination of factors 
such as joint task complexity, inter-partner diversity, strategic implications and equity.  Their 
cooperation cost framework takes a broader perspective than traditional transaction cost analysis, 
and can be viewed as a framework that encompasses transactions costs.  
In addressing cooperation costs and their implications for cooperation, it is important to 
recognize the additional complexity associated with the extent to which cooperation brings 
together non-homogeneous cultures.  Henisz and Zelner (2004) examine cooperation between 
private and public entities and highlight the political and other risks inherent in such cooperation.  
The notion that elected officials have views that are not necessarily consistent with the views of 
their constituents (the agency problem) suggests huge differences in the cultures of the private 
and public sectors.  Hence, cooperative efforts that involve greater privatization or private sector 
activities may increase cooperation costs, or at least greater apprehension about cooperation.  
The complexity of cooperation costs, the degree of uncertainty about these, the 
potentially persistent nature of these costs over time, and the potential that some of these costs 
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could be frontloaded suggest that the ability to achieve cost savings from cooperation may at 
least be curbed in the short run.  In other words, the full benefits of joint action may not accrue 
for a while, and the short-term impact of cooperation may be significantly modulated.  Feiock 
argues that transactions costs can be reduced by altering institutional structures that affect inter-
jurisdictional cooperation, but empirical evidence on this is not widely available (Feiock 2005).  
Furthermore, structural change is more likely to occur in the long run than in the short run.  
Therefore, there is need to understand the short and long-term dynamics of cooperation costs in 
evaluating the ability to reduce service provision costs through cooperation. 
It is obvious from the above discussion that cooperation costs need to be addressed 
explicitly in analysis of the barriers to cooperation.  It is also obvious that these costs need to be 
examined in the context of short and long run dimensions.  This paper presents a simple theoretic 
model of municipal costs, analyzes the implications of cooperation or consolidation, and 
evaluates the dynamic nature of these costs over time.  Cooperation costs are explicitly 
accounted for in defining a total cost function for communities that are cooperating.  The 
potential obstacles to the realization of reduced municipal costs due to cooperation are 
highlighted in the context of the model.  The model provides a framework for looking at various 
issues such as the benefits of alliances, degree of complexity, inter-party diversity, equity, and 
relative sizes of partners.   
 
Cost Structure of Local Units of Government  
 The appropriate starting point for evaluating the implications of cooperation for the cost 
of service provision for communities is to explore the service provision costs for each 
community.  When two communities combine, via cooperation or outright consolidation, each 
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brings to the combined situation elements (if not all) of their existing independent costs, at least 
at the onset. This assertion is based on the expectation that barriers do exist that preclude 
communities from instantly realizing reduced costs (assumes discovery and negotiation time 
before realization of benefits and great uncertainty due to incomplete information and other 
factors).  For the purpose of simplification, we start by assuming zero cooperation costs. 
Cost Structure without Cooperation Costs 
 Consider the case of m communities seeking to cooperate.   Denote the total cost of 
providing services by the ith community as SCi where: 
(1)  . ( )∑= nj jji QPSC
In Equation (1), there are n services being provided by the ith community, the cost per unit of the 
jth of which is Pj and the service volume, which is easily proxied by the population to be served 
or the size of the tax base, is Qi.  In Equation (1), the total cost of service provision is the sum of 
the product of the unit cost of providing each service and the population of the served 
community. 
Now, consider the choice by multiple communities to provide joint services through 
cooperation or outright consolidation.  Denote the total joint cost for the combined communities 
as SC where: 
(2) . ∑= mi iSCSC ∑ ∑= mi nj ijij QP
To simplify the relationship depicted in Equation (2), we can start with the simple case of two 
communities without losing much in terms of the essence of the analysis.  A more general case 
can easily be explored later.  The total joint cost for two communities is depicted as follows: 
(3)  21 SCSCSC += ∑ ∑= 2i nj ijij QP  ∑ ∑+= nj nj jjjj QPQP 2211 . 
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Equation (3) assumes that there are no transaction costs and eliminates any difficulty factor in 
the process of cooperation between communities. 
To examine the dynamics of service costs over time (assuming no transaction costs), we 
explore the changes in Equation (3) in the form of elasticities.  Denote the percentage change in a 
variable as ε where εx = δ ln x = δx/x.  Hence, from Equation (3), we obtain: 
(4) ( ) ( 21 SCSCSC +ε=ε ) ( ) ( )2211 SCSC
SCSC
SC
SC ε

+ε

=  
          ( ) ( )∑∑ ε+ε nj jjnj jj QPSCSCQPSCSC 222111=  . 
Note that Si = (SCi /SC) is the share of the total initial joint budget that is attributable to the ith 
community (S1 = SC1 /SC and S2 = SC2 /SC).   It therefore captures relative community size, 
bargaining power, budget equity, inter-party diversity, strategic implications, and other 
dominance related factors.  Equation (4) can further be depicted as follows:  
(5) ( ) ( ) ( )∑∑ ε+ε=ε nj jjnj jj QPSQPSSC 222111  
          ( )( ) ( )( )∑∑ ε+ε nj jjjnj jjj QPSSQPSS 22221111=  
         ( ) ( )∑ ∑ ε+ε+ε+ε= nj nj jjjjjj QPSSQPSS 22221111 . 
Since εP1j and εQ1j are measures of the total or partial adjustability of unit service costs and 
service coverage, Equation (5) indicates that the adjustability of total post-collaboration, joint 
municipal costs is a function of the relative sizes of the collaborating communities, the relative 
sizes of the budgets for each service provided that is being coordinated, the adjustability 
(reducibility) of the costs of each service, and the adjustability of the scope and size of the 
serviced communities.  As indicated above, the former relate directly to bargaining power, 
budget equity, inter-party diversity and strategic implications.   
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The analysis above can be put in a temporal context by looking at pre-collaboration 
activities, collaborative activities and post-collaboration activities.  Recall that collaboration 
costs are infinite from a temporal standpoint.  Without going into the full range of transactions 
costs discussed above, and by focusing strictly on pre-collaborative activities, one observes that 
at the onset of collaborative ventures, even in the absence of collaborative activities and post-
collaboration activities, there would exist discovery costs.  Therefore, discovery costs represent 
the preliminary levels of collaborative costs, which must be overcome before a collaborative 
activity can realize the benefits of economies of scale.  In other words, it takes some effort and 
time to discover the potential to realize economies of scale benefits/savings. 
With the assumption of zero collaboration costs, it is also plausible to further assume that 
cooperation will not increase the costs of services for each of the communities.  However, its 
potential to reduce total joint costs would be more limited in the short run than in the long run.  If 
we assume the εP1j and εP2j vectors to be zero in the short run, and the εQ1j and εQ2j vectors to 
also be zero in the short run, then there would be no benefits to cooperation in the short run 
because of discovery costs.  If however, we assume the εP1j and εP2j vectors to be less than zero 
in the long run (economies of scale accrue beyond the short run), and the εQ1j and εQ2j vectors to 
be zero in the long run (service area remains the same and the benefits accrue through cost 
savings), then there would be a cost saving in the long run due to cooperation.  The potential cost 
savings are obviously related largely to the ability to reduce the unit costs of specific services.  
More importantly, even without getting to the full range of cooperation costs, the discovery costs 
must be overcome first.  
Obviously, for some services, there are opportunities for almost instant cost savings.  
Examples include services whose unit costs vary inversely with the size of the community 
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serviced (e.g., insurance costs that vary with the size of the community covered, services that 
have huge fixed costs and lower variable costs, and services for which discounts are offered for 
large volumes).  Therefore, from Equation (5), it is apparent that short-term cost savings may be 
limited to the special category costs described above, while long-term cost savings arise mainly 
from long-term ability to focus on cost-reducing strategies that would allow municipalities to 
benefit from economies of scale.   
The long-term ability to benefit from cooperation is therefore a function of the vision of 
the communities involved, the central role that cost reduction plays in their motivation, and the 
management and oversight infrastructure in place to achieve such cost reductions.  Also, the 
short-term ability to benefit from cooperation depends on the nature of the areas of cooperation 
chosen by cooperating communities and the existing economies of scale benefits associated with 
such services.  In communities that insist on keeping the functions of two merging communities 
the same and on maintaining duplication, obviously, total cost reduction would be slow to 
achieve.  It is also important to note that short-term cost savings are not automatic. 
The demonstration in equation (5) that when cost savings occur, their impact on joint 
costs is amplified when the relative size (share) of the community whose costs and service size is 
most adjustable is high, suggests the importance of the sizes of partnering entities and the 
sources of cost savings. Collaborating on services with significant cost savings could yield little 
benefit if the bulk of the saving is due to activities of a community with a small share of the joint 
initial cost.  This relates, again, to the issues of bargaining power, budget equity, inter-party 
diversity and strategic implications.  If the potential for reduced cost is higher when a dominant 
community also has huge potential for saving, then one is encouraged to wonder if there is 
incentive for a large community to partner with a smaller one.  One motivation for such a 
 11
partnership would be if the smaller community provides the source of innovation (push over the 
tipping point) for cost savings.  In other words, if a small community can help a larger 
community achieve savings by moving the combined entity to a new level of optimality, then 
there is incentive on both sides for cooperation, even though the momentum for cost savings 
arises from the size of the larger community. 
Accounting for Cooperation Costs 
Recall that cooperation costs include transaction costs.  By definition, a transaction cost 
is a cost incurred in making an economic exchange or interaction. According to the literature, 
transaction costs include (1) search and information costs (which include the discovery cost 
component we have previously introduced), (2) negotiation or bargaining costs (pre-cooperation 
and thereafter), (3) policing and enforcement costs (mostly after the discovery stage), and (4) 
agency costs.  On the basis of the work of White (2005) and White and Lui (2005), other 
cooperation costs include costs associated with (1) joint-task complexity, (2) achieving an 
equitable partnership, (3) realizing strategic net benefits from strategic liaison with others, and (4) 
realizing the net benefits of interparty diversity.  
In the context of municipal cooperation, discovery, search and information costs are costs 
such as those incurred in determining what areas to collaborate in, the potential cost savings 
associated, and the cost associated with finding new vendors or contractors that would contribute 
to cost reductions.  Negotiation or bargaining costs are the costs required to come to an 
acceptable agreement with the cooperating government, drawing up appropriate contracts, 
negotiating with associated unions and employees, and paying appropriate negotiators and 
lawyers.  Policing and enforcement costs are the costs of making sure that the other party sticks 
to the terms of the contract, managing the process, and taking appropriate action if activities 
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deviate from plan. Agency costs are costs associated with educating and notifying constituents, 
negotiating with opponents, and shepherding collaborative ideas through the decision making 
process (Feiock 2002).    
Within the framework of cooperation costs established by White (2005), costs associated 
with joint task complexity refer to the geographic, hierarchical, market or technological scope of 
interaction as well as the intensity, or depth of interaction between the parties.  Interpartner 
diversity refers to the unique set of characteristics of each partner that may include things such as 
resources, capabilities, and formal and informal processes and cultures.  Equity refers to ratio of 
benefits to costs of cooperation by each cooperating party.  Strategic implications include the 
gains or losses incurred as a result of collaborations that link a cooperating party indirectly to 
other organizations as a result of the initial direct cooperative activities.            
Cooperation costs are obviously quite relevant in the case of municipal cooperation.  
Oversight, coordination, management and integration have direct and indirect cost dimensions, 
as well as short and long-term dimensions.  Due to bureaucracy and the highly political nature of 
local units of government, cooperation is likely to be very expensive, perhaps moreso than 
private sector cooperation.  The literature on corporate mergers and acquisitions has further 
identified other types of transaction costs, including the costs associated with bringing together 
different cultures and styles of doing business (Adelaja, et al. 1999).  In the next section, we 
account for these costs in evaluating the costs of collaborating communities.   
Cost Structure with Cooperation Costs 
Denote the transaction cost of a cooperating community as CCi and the total cooperation 
costs of all cooperating communities combined by CC, where: 
(6) mSCCC ρ= ( )∑ ∑ρ= mi nj ijij QPm  , 
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where SC is the combined initial cost of the partners (expected to be directly correlated with CC), 
m is the number of communities cooperating (also expected to be directly correlated with CC) 
and ρ is the difficulty adjustment factor (or a coefficient that translates complexity factors into 
cooperation costs).  Obviously, ρ starts out larger than zero (due to the presence of discovery 
costs and other cooperation costs) and has the potential to reach zero over time.  If in fact there is 
a learning curve, and collaborative activities become easier to achieve over time, then ρ would 
trend toward zero in the long run.  The ability of CCi to decline to zero is compromised by the m 
and SC difficulty factors, but declining values of ρ mitigate such compromise.    
Equation (6) can be transformed as follows assuming constant ρ and m: 
(7) ( )( )∑ ∑ερ=ε mi nj ijij QPmCC)(  
         ( ) ( )( )∑∑ ε+ερ= nj jjnj jj QPSQPSm 222111  
           ( ) ( )( )∑∑ ε+ε+ε+ερ nj jjjnj jjj QPSSQPSSm 22221111=  . 
Assuming however, that ρ and m are not constant, then: 
(8)  ( )( )∑ ∑ε+ε+ερ=ε mi nj ijij QPmCC)(  
           ( ) ( )( )∑∑ ε+ε+ε+ερ nj jjnj jj QPSQPSm 222111=  
           ( ) ( )( )∑∑ ε+ε+ε+ε+ε+ερ= nj jjjnj jjj QPSSQPSSm 22221111  . 
Adjusting Equations (5) by accounting for Equations (7) and (8), one obtains the following: 
(9) ( ) ( )∑∑ ε+ε+ε+ε=ε nj jjjnj jjj QPSSQPSSSC 22221111)(  
             ( ) ( )( )∑∑ ε+ε+ε+ερ nj jjjnj jjj QPSSQPSSm 22221111+  
          ( ) ( ) ( )( )∑∑ ε+ε+ε+ερ+ nj jjjnj jjj QPSSQPSSm 222211111=   
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(10) ( ) ( )∑∑ ε+ε+ε+ε=ε nj jjjnj jjj QPSSQPSSSC 22221111)(  
  ( ) ( )( )∑∑ ε+ε+ε+ε+ε+ερ nj jjjnj jjj QPSSQPSSm 22221111+  
           ( ) ( )( )∑∑ ε+ε+ε+ε+ε+ερ nj jjjnj jjj QPSSQPSSm 222211112  .=  
Both Equations (9) and (10) suggest that the benefits of cooperation depend on the relative sizes 
and service areas of collaborating communities, the potential to reduce costs in the short and long 
run, and the number of cooperating communities.  They also suggest the importance of 
understanding the dynamics of specific elements of cooperation costs over time.  From (9) and 
(10), the adjustability of joint municipal cost is a function of these factors, the adjustability of the 
sizes of the serviced communities, as well as the ability to achieve specific cost reductions.  As 
shown in these equations, strategies to reduce transaction costs must focus on the role of ρ, 
which is the reducible element of transaction costs over time.  Obviously, ρ starts out being 
positive, could eventually become zero in the long run and possibly could even be negative.  The 
fact that ρ, and therefore CC, are positive, at least for a while, highlight the challenges that 
communities may have to face as they pursue economies of scale benefits through cooperation.  
It also provides a framework for looking at the need for government intervention to reduce the 
barriers to cooperation, if indeed cooperation maximizes overall social welfare.   
 
Implications and Conclusions 
Past studies have focused extensively on such issues as barriers to cooperation, 
information needs to encourage cooperation, necessary enforcements to ensure effective 
cooperation, the nature of inter-local bargaining activities, the economies of scale benefits of 
collaboration, positive and negative externalities of collaboration, agency problems and 
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implications of leadership for cost reductions, and a host of other issues.  This analysis 
introduces another dimension by developing a framework for looking at the costs for cooperating 
communities that integrates all these concepts into a conceptual economic model.  One 
conclusion is that even when unit costs of providing services and the population of the served 
community are adjustable over time (increasing the likelihood of cost saving), these are subject 
to relative community shares as well as the relative contribution of a service whose cost is 
reducible to the total budget of the joint activity.  This suggests that the ability to realize joint 
cost saving depends on which community is responsible for the accrual of such savings.  Given 
this finding, one is encouraged to be skeptical about the notion that a large community with 
significant potential for cost saving will partner to achieve such saving in the first place, 
considering the fact that collaboration would add very little.  The analysis suggests that more 
equal entities are more likely to partner than unequal entities, unless there is potential for a small 
entity to push a larger entity beyond a tipping point for cost savings.  Of course the services have 
to be appropriate and conducive. It is important to note that the extent to which collaboration will 
encourage cost saving depends on how much the cooperating process drives communities toward 
searching for joint cost savings.  That is, assuming little benefits in the short run, long run 
benefits are enhanced when there are strong motivations to achieve cost savings via the 
collaboration process.   
State policies that target ρ or the Pjs by encouraging the reduction of cooperation costs or 
the discovery of specific service cost savings would be very helpful.  For example, State 
government can pass legislation to reward bodies creating joint plans for economic growth, long-
term land use, transportation, etc.  An example of state intervention in creating 
intergovernmental cooperation is State Statute 66.0316 passed by the State of Wisconsin which 
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requires that beginning in January 2003, all local governments within Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSA’s) must sign at least two compacts with neighboring municipalities or counties for 
provision of joint services. Additionally, the Budget Repair Bill of 2002 earmarked $45 million 
in 2004 Local Shared Revenues to reimburse local governments demonstrating cost savings in 
2003 from consolidating such services.  Incentives, obviously, help to modulate the adverse 
effects  of cooperation costs.  If structured well, such incentives could also directly reduce service 
costs if they encouraged faster and better discovery of opportunities for cost reduction.   
The fundamental contribution of this paper is its theoretical definition of collaboration 
costs, pre and post-collaboration costs, pre and post-collaboration service costs, and the 
treatment of the dynamics of these costs over time.  By so doing, the formidable role of 
collaboration costs and the need to overcome these are further highlighted.  One implication is 
that states that are currently pushing for inter-local cooperation clearly evaluate the potential for 
such activities to yield benefits before pushing those activities.  Another is the need to consider 
incentives to foster collaboration.    
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